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Abstract
Carroll and Kimball (1996) have shown that, in the class of utility
functions that are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and have nonnega-
tive third derivatives, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) is suffi-
cient for the concavity of consumption functions in general consumption-
saving problems. This paper shows that HARA is necessary, implying the
concavity of consumption is not a robust prediction outside the HARA
class.
Keywords: concavity, consumption function, hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion, robust predictions.
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1 Introduction
The notion that the marginal propensity to consume decreases with wealth,
or that the consumption function is concave, dates back at least to Keynes
(1936). This observation is important in macroeconomics because the effect
of a fiscal transfer of one dollar to a wealthy household is smaller than that
to a poor household, implying that fiscal policies need to account for house-
hold heterogeneity. In an important contribution, Carroll and Kimball (1996)
have shown that in the class of utility functions that are strictly increasing, are
strictly concave, and have nonnegative third derivatives, hyperbolic absolute
risk aversion (HARA) is sufficient for the concavity of consumption functions in
finite-horizon consumption-saving problems without liquidity constraints. Their
result has been extended in several directions: Carroll and Kimball (2001, Sec-
tion 5) obtain concavity under finite-horizon, HARA utility, and liquidity con-
straints; Nishiyama and Kato (2012) obtain concavity under infinite-horizon,
quadratic utility, and liquidity constraints; Ma et al. (2020, Proposition 2.5 and
Remark 2.1) obtain concavity under infinite horizon, constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utility, and liquidity constraints.1
In all of these theoretical papers, the utility function is restricted to be
HARA. Thus a natural question is whether it is possible to obtain the concavity
∗Department of Economics, University of California San Diego. Email: atoda@ucsd.edu.
1It is clear from the proof technique of Ma et al. (2020) that concavity obtains in finite- or
infinite-horizon, with or without liquidity constraints, and HARA utility if the domain of the
utility function is appropriately modified. See Section 3 for more discussion.
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of consumption functions under weaker assumptions: does concavity hold in a
larger class than HARA, or is concavity a non-robust prediction that fails to
hold outside the HARA class? This paper provides a definitive answer to this
question, which is the latter. More precisely, I show that if the utility function
is strictly increasing, is strictly concave, has a positive third derivative, but is
not HARA, then there exists a finite-horizon (in fact, one period) consumption-
saving problem such that the consumption function is not concave. Combined
with the earlier results on the concavity of consumption functions just cited,
my result shows that in the class of natural utility functions, HARA is both
necessary and sufficient for the concavity of consumption functions in general
consumption-saving problems.
2 Main result
Following Carroll and Kimball (1996), I consider a general consumption-saving
problem with a finite horizon. The problem can be informally described as
follows. The agent is endowed with initial wealth w0 > 0 and lives for T periods.
The period utility function is u : (0,∞) → R, which is strictly increasing and
concave. The agent receives income Yt ≥ 0 at the beginning of time t. The
gross return on wealth between time t− 1 and t is Rt > 0. The agent discounts
utility between time t− 1 and t using the discount factor βt > 0, where β0 ≡ 1.
Letting ct > 0 be the consumption at time t and wt ≥ 0 the financial wealth at
the beginning of time t, the agent’s objective is to solve
maximize E0
T∑
t=0
(
t∏
s=0
βs
)
u(ct) (1a)
subject to wt+1 = Rt+1(wt − ct) + Yt+1 ≥ 0, (1b)
where the initial wealth w0 = w > 0 is given and (1b) is the budget and
borrowing constraint. The discount factor βt, return on wealth Rt, and income
Yt can all be stochastic.
If a solution to the consumption-saving problem (1) exists, the time t con-
sumption ct can be viewed as a function of the current wealth wt, which we call
the consumption function. The main result of this paper is that if the utility
function satisfies some regularity conditions and the consumption function is
always concave regardless of the specification of the process (βt, Rt, Yt)
T
t=1, then
u must exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA).
We now make this statement more precise. If the consumption function
is concave regardless of the specification of the process (βt, Rt, Yt)
T
t=1, then in
particular the consumption function in a one period problem (T = 1) must
always be concave. We can then rewrite (1) as the static maximization problem
max
c
u(c) + E[βu(R(w − c) + Y )] (2)
where β,R, Y > 0 are arbitrary random variables and c satisfiesR(w−c)+Y ≥ 0.
Furthermore, if β,R, Y are arbitrary, in particular we may restrict attention to
problems in which β,R, Y take finitely many values. In this case the expectation
in (2) is a finite sum and always well-defined.
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The following lemma shows that under standard monotonicity, concavity,
and Inada conditions, the consumption and saving functions can be unambigu-
ously defined, which are differentiable and strictly increasing.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (i) the utility function u : [0,∞) → R ∪ {−∞} is
twice continuously differentiable on (0,∞) and satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and
limx↓0 u
′(x) = ∞, and (ii) the random vector (β,R, Y ) ≫ 0 has finite support.
Then for any initial wealth w > 0, the consumption-saving problem (2) has a
unique solution, and the consumption function c = c(w) and saving function
s(w) = w − c(w) satisfy the Euler equation
u′(c(w)) = E[βRu′(Rs(w) + Y )]. (3)
Furthermore, c, s are continuously differentiable and c′(w), s′(w) ∈ (0, 1).
In what follows, we maintain the assumptions of Lemma 1. Since the saving
function s is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, its range S :=
s((0,∞)) is an open interval of R. Since u′ is strictly decreasing, by (3) for
each s ∈ S there exists a unique c ∈ (0,∞) such that u′(c) = E[βRu′(Rs+ Y )].
Therefore we can unambiguously define the function g : S → (0,∞) by
g(s) := (u′)−1(E[βRu′(Rs+ Y )]). (4)
The function g in (4) returns the consumption level c > 0 that implies the
saving s ∈ S. Since u′ is strictly decreasing, g is clearly strictly increasing.
Ma et al. (2020, Proposition 2.5) show that the concavity of g is sufficient for
the concavity of the consumption function. The following lemma shows that
the concavity of g is actually necessary.
Lemma 2. If c is concave, then so is g in (4).
The following lemma, which is closely related to Hardy et al. (1952, Section
3.16), plays a crucial role in the proof of the main result.
Lemma 3. Let I ⊂ R be an open interval and φ : I → R be a twice differentiable
function such that φ(I) = (0,∞), φ′ < 0, and either φ′′ > 0 on I or φ′′ ≡ 0 on
I. For p, x, v ∈ RN with p, v ≫ 0 and x ∈ IN , let
g(s; p, x, v) := φ−1
(
N∑
n=1
pnφ(xn + vns)
)
,
which is well-defined in the neighborhood of s = 0. Then g is concave in s for
arbitrary p, x, v if and only if φ and I take one of the following forms:
• φ(x) = c(ax+ b)−1/a, −1 < a < 0, I = (−∞,−b/a),
• φ(x) = −bce−x/b, b > 0, I = R, or
• φ(x) = c(ax+ b)−1/a, a > 0, I = (−b/a,∞),
where c > 0 is arbitrary.
Note that in either case in Lemma 3, log-differentiating φ, we obtain
φ′(x)
φ(x)
= −
1
ax+ b
, (5)
where a > −1 with I = {x ∈ R : ax+ b > 0}. We can now state the main result.
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Theorem 4. Suppose that (i) the utility function u : [0,∞) → R ∪ {−∞}
is three times differentiable on (0,∞) and satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, u′′′ > 0,
limx↓0 u
′(x) =∞, and limx→∞ u
′(x) = 0, and (ii) the random vector (β,R, Y )≫
0 has finite support. If the consumption function in Lemma 1 is concave for
arbitrary distribution of (β,R, Y ), then u exhibits constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA). Conversely, if u is CRRA, then the consumption function of the
consumption-saving problem (1) is concave.
Proof. Let c, s be the consumption and saving functions. By Lemma 1, c, s are
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and S = s((0,∞)) is an open
interval of R. Let us show 0 ∈ S. If 0 /∈ S, then either S ⊂ (0,∞) or S ⊂
(−∞, 0).
If S ⊂ (0,∞), then s(w) > 0 for all w. Since c(w) + s(w) = w, we have
c(w) < w. Using the Euler equation (3) and u′′ < 0, we obtain
u′(w) < u′(c(w)) = E[βRu′(Rs(w) + Y )] ≤ E[βRu′(Y )] <∞.
Letting w ↓ 0, we obtain a contradiction because u′(0) =∞.
If S ⊂ (−∞, 0), then s(w) < 0 for all w. Since c(w) + s(w) = w, we have
c(w) > w. Again by (3) and u′′ < 0, we obtain
u′(w) > u′(c(w)) = E[βRu′(Rs(w) + Y )] ≥ E[βRu′(Y )] > 0.
Letting w ↑ ∞, we obtain a contradiction because u′(∞) = 0.
The above argument shows that 0 ∈ S regardless of the specification of
(β,R, Y ). Since (β,R, Y ) has finite support, we can write g(s) in (4) as
g(s) = (u′)−1
(
N∑
n=1
pinβnRnu
′(Rns+ Yn)
)
,
where pin > 0 is the probability of state n. Since (βn, Rn, Yn)≫ 0 is arbitrary,
we can apply Lemma 3 for φ = u′, I = (0,∞), pn = pinβnRn, xn = Yn, and
vn = Rn, yielding u
′(x) = φ(x) = c(ax + b)−1/a for some a, c > 0 and b = 0.
Since the multiplicative constant c does not affect the ordering of utility, we
may assume u′(x) = x−γ with γ = 1/a > 0, so u is CRRA.
The sufficiency of CRRA for the concavity of consumption can be shown by
the same argument as in Ma et al. (2020, Proposition 2.5 and Remark 2.1).
3 Discussion
Theorem 4 essentially shows that for the consumption functions in general
consumption-saving problems to be concave, constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) is necessary and sufficient. This statement may appear to be in conflict
with Carroll and Kimball (1996), who have shown that hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) is sufficient for concavity. However, there is no contradiction
between the two results. This is because in Theorem 4, to avoid unnecessary
complications, I have restricted the utility function to have domain (0,∞) and
satisfy appropriate Inada conditions. If the domain is changed to (−b/a,∞),
then it is straightforward to adopt the proof of Theorem 4 to show that u is
HARA, as we can see from (5) with φ = u′. This argument shows that for the
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concavity of consumption functions, HARA is necessary and sufficient (among
the class of utility functions with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u′′′ ≥ 0).
Next, we discuss some subtleties regarding the concavity of consumption
functions in the existing literature.
When describing the consumption-saving problem, Carroll and Kimball (1996)
are unclear about the domain of the utility function, Inada conditions, and bor-
rowing constraints. Since the proof of their Lemma 2 uses first-order condi-
tions (that hold for interior solutions), they implicitly assume that consumption
can be any value in the domain of the HARA utility (which trivially satisfies
the Inada conditions) and that the agent can save or borrow freely. In the
consumption-saving problems (1), (2), and Lemma 1, these assumptions were
made explicit. However, note that the possibility of borrowing is used in Theo-
rem 4 to show the necessity of HARA for the concavity of consumption functions;
the possibility of borrowing is not required for the sufficiency of HARA for con-
cavity, and in fact Ma et al. (2020, Remark 2.1) show that HARA is sufficient
even in the presence of borrowing constraints.2
Theorem 4 and the subsequent discussion suggest that we cannot expect the
concavity of consumption functions unless the stochastic process (βt, Rt, Yt)
T
t=1
is somehow restricted. Indeed, Gong et al. (2012) show that in a finite-horizon,
deterministic consumption-saving problem in which the discount factor βt and
the gross risk-free rate Rt satisfy βtRt ≥ 1, the concavity of the absolute risk
tolerance −u′(x)/u′′(x) is sufficient for the concavity of consumption functions.
This condition is much weaker than HARA, as the absolute risk tolerance is
affine when u is HARA. However, note that the condition βR ≥ 1 is quite
restrictive, and in fact not satisfied in stationary general equilibrium models
with infinitely-lived agents (see the discussion in the proof of Theorem 8 of
Stachurski and Toda, 2019).
Finally, in the more recent literature, several authors have studied consumption-
saving problems with hyperbolic discounting (Cao and Werning, 2018; Morris and Postlewaite,
2020). Although the concavity of consumption functions has not been discussed
in this context, since exponential discounting is a special case of hyperbolic dis-
counting, the result in this paper immediately implies that we cannot expect
concavity unless the utility function is HARA.
A Proof of lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix w > 0. Suppose (β,R, Y ) takes the value (βn, Rn, Yn)
with probability pin > 0, where n = 1, . . . , N . Define
c¯ = sup {c > 0 : (∀n)Rn(w − c) + Yn ≥ 0} = w +min
n
Yn
Rn
≥ w > 0,
which is well-defined because Rn, Yn > 0. Define f : (0, c¯)→ R as the objective
function in (2). Since
f ′(c) = u′(c)− E[βRu′(R(w − c) + Y )],
f ′′(c) = u′′(c) + E[βR2u′′(R(w − c) + Y )] < 0
2Strictly speaking, Ma et al. (2020, Remark 2.1) concerns CRRA utility, but this is because
the domain of the utility function is restricted to (0,∞). It is straightforward to handle HARA
utility by shifting the domain.
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because u′′ < 0, f is strictly concave. By the Inada condition, we have limc↓0 f
′(c) =
∞ and limc↑c¯ f
′(c) = −∞. Since f ′ is continuous and strictly decreasing, by the
intermediate value theorem there exists a unique c∗ ∈ (0, c¯) satisfying f ′(c∗) = 0.
By the strict concavity of f , this c∗ =: c(w) uniquely solves the optimization
problem (2). Letting s(w) = w − c(w), the first-order condition f ′(c(w)) = 0
implies the Euler equation (3).
To show the continuous differentiability of c, let
F (w, c) = u′(c)− E[βRu′(R(w − c) + Y )].
Since u′′ < 0, we obtain
∂F
∂w
= −E[βR2u′′(R(w − c) + Y )] > 0,
∂F
∂c
= u′′(c) + E[βR2u′′(R(w − c) + Y )] < 0.
By the implicit function theorem, c is continuously differentiable and
c′(w) = −
∂F/∂w
∂F/∂c
=
−E[βR2u′′(R(w − c) + Y )]
−u′′(c)− E[βR2u′′(R(w − c) + Y )]
∈ (0, 1).
Then s′(w) = 1− c′(w) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. By the discussion preceding Lemma 2, we have
g(s(w)) = c(w) (6)
for all w > 0. If g is not concave, we can take s1, s2 ∈ S and α ∈ [0, 1] such that
g((1− α)s1 + αs2) < (1 − α)g(s1) + αg(s2). (7)
Let wj = s
−1(sj) for j = 1, 2. Then sj = s(wj) and g(sj) = c(wj) by (6). Define
c¯ := (1 − α)c(w1) + αc(w2) and w¯ := (1 − α)w1 + αw2. Since by assumption c
is concave, we have
c(w¯) = c((1 − α)w1 + αw2) ≥ (1− α)c(w1) + αc(w2) = c¯. (8)
Therefore
c(w¯) ≥ c¯ = (1− α)c(w1) + αc(w2) (∵ (8))
= (1− α)g(s1) + αg(s2) > g((1− α)s1 + αs2) (∵ (6), (7))
= g((1− α)(w1 − c(w1)) + α(w2 − c(w2)))
= g(w¯ − c¯) ≥ g(w¯ − c(w¯)) (∵ (8), g increasing)
= g(s(w¯)) = c(w¯), (∵ (6))
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is similar to Hardy et al. (1952, Section 3.16),
who assume φ′ > 0 and the goal is to characterize the convexity of g. Since
these authors do not cover all the fine details, I reproduce their argument.
To simplify the notation, write g = g(s; p, x, v) and
∑
=
∑N
n=1. Since
xn ∈ I for all I, I is open, φ(I) = (0,∞), and φ is monotonic, g is well-defined
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in a neighborhood of 0. Differentiating both sides of φ(g(s)) =
∑
φ(xn + vns)
with respect to s twice, we obtain
φ′(g)g′ =
∑
pnvnφ
′(xn + vns),
φ′′(g)(g′)2 + φ′(g)g′′ =
∑
pnv
2
nφ
′′(xn + vns).
Eliminating g′, we obtain
φ′(g)3g′′ = φ′(g)2
∑
pnv
2
nφ
′′(xn + vns)− φ
′′(g)
(∑
pnvnφ
′(xn + vns)
)2
.
Since by assumption φ′ < 0, we have g′′(s) ≤ 0 if and only if
φ′(g)2
∑
pnv
2
nφ
′′(xn + vns)− φ
′′(g)
(∑
pnvnφ
′(xn + vns)
)2
≥ 0. (9)
If φ′′ ≡ 0 on I, (9) is trivial. In this case φ is quadratic and (because φ > 0,
φ′ < 0, and φ(I) = (0,∞)) we must have φ(x) = c(ax + b)−1/a for a = −1/2
and c > 0.
Therefore it remains to consider the case φ′′ > 0 on I. If (9) holds for all s
in a neighborhood of 0 for arbitrary x ∈ IN and p, v ≫ 0, in particular letting
s = 0, we obtain
φ′(g)2
∑
pnv
2
nφ
′′(xn)− φ
′′(g)
(∑
pnvnφ
′(xn)
)2
≥ 0
⇐⇒
φ′(g)2
φ′′(g)
≥
(
∑
pnvnφ
′
n)
2∑
pnv2nφ
′′
n
, (10)
where φn = φ(xn) and φ
′
n, φ
′′
n are defined analogously. Applying the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we obtain
(∑
pnvnφ
′
n
)2
=

∑√pnφ′′nvn
√
pnφ′n
2
φ′′n


2
≤
(∑
pnv
2
nφ
′′
n
)(∑ pnφ′n2
φ′′n
)
,
with equality achieved when vn = kφ
′
n/φ
′′
n for some k < 0 (so that vn > 0).
Therefore (10) for all x ∈ IN and p, v ≫ 0 is equivalent to
φ′(g)2
φ′′(g)
≥
∑ pnφ′n2
φ′′n
for all x ∈ IN and p≫ 0. (11)
Now define yn = φ(xn) and
Φ(y) :=
[φ′(φ−1(y))]2
φ′′(φ−1(y))
. (12)
Noting that φ(I) = (0,∞), (11) is equivalent to
Φ
(∑
pnyn
)
≥
∑
pnΦ(yn) for all p, y ∈ R
N
++. (13)
If we take N = 2, y1 = x, y2 = y, p1 = y/2x, and p2 = 1/2 in (13), we obtain
Φ(y) ≥
y
2x
Φ(x) +
1
2
Φ(y) ⇐⇒
Φ(y)
y
≥
Φ(x)
x
.
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Interchanging the role of x, y, it follows that Φ(y)/y is constant, and hence
Φ(y) = ky for some constant k > 0 (because φ′′ > 0). Using the definition of Φ
in (12) and letting x = φ−1(y), we obtain
φ′(x)2
φ′′(x)
= kφ(x) ⇐⇒
φ(x)φ′′(x) − φ′(x)2
φ′(x)2
= a for x ∈ I,
where a = 1/k − 1 > −1. Integrating both sides, we obtain
−
φ(x)
φ′(x)
= ax+ b ⇐⇒
φ′(x)
φ(x)
= −
1
ax+ b
,
where a > −1 and b is such that ax + b > 0 (because φ > 0 and φ′ < 0). The
forms of φ and I in Lemma 3 follow by integrating both sides with respect to x
and considering each case −1 < a < 0, a = 0, and a > 0 separately.
Conversely, if φ and I take one of the forms in Lemma 3, then we have
Φ(y) = ya+1 in (12), and the inequality (13) is trivial. Then we can go back the
argument to show that g is concave.
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